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  • Séminaire,

Webinaire junior sur l'économie des migrations

Publié le 19 juin 2020 Mis à jour le 19 juin 2020
Le 29 juin 2020 De 16:00 à 17:30

Zibin Huang et Obeid Ur Rehman

Peer Effects, Parental Migration and Children’s Human Capital: A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis in China.

Zibin Huang (University of Rochester)


In China, migrant children are disadvantaged and sometimes cannot enroll in public schools in migration destinations. Some migrant workers have to leave their children behind in home town, which causes left-behind children problem. In this study, I first identify the peer effects of migrant children and left-behind children on their classmates using a national-wide classroom random assignment. Then, I analyse the human capital consequences of this education discrimination in a spatial equilibrium model. Results show that there are negative spillovers from migrant and left-behind students. However, the spillovers are reduced as time goes by. Besides, the negative effect is generally larger from left-behind students. In the counterfactual analysis, I find that if the enrollment restriction on migrant children is relaxed, more families and their children will migrate, and at the same time, the average human capital of the society can increase notably. Low-skill families from small cities benefit most. The policy works through two channels. First, it directly increases the enrollment rate in good public schools and alleviates the left-behind children problem. Second, it attracts more left-behind students to migrate with their parents and indirectly reduces spillovers. This is the first formal quantitative analysis of the public school enrollment policy in China.

Spousal Communication and Information Sharing: Evidence from Migrant Workers and their Spouses.

Obeid Ur Rehman (University of Michigan)


In household decision making, the strategic use of private information is often a source of inefficient outcomes. For transnational households - where one spouse temporarily migrates for work - this information asymmetry is further exacerbated and can reduce the development impact of such migration. I conduct a randomized controlled trial to study spousal communication and information sharing among temporary Filipino migrant workers in the UAE and their spouses in the Philippines. I find that migrants and their spouses have biased beliefs about each other's finances. Migrants underestimate spouses' income and both migrants and spouses overestimate each others' expenses. Spouses and certain subgroups of migrants strategically misreport information to each other. Spouses under-report their income to induce migrants to send more remittances and income hiding is greater when the migrant does not exercise more control over their household's finances. Female and high remittance sending migrants also under-report their income, to avoid sharing it with their spouse.