Published on May 12, 2026 – Updated on May 12, 2026
Location
Pôle Tertiaire - Site La Rotonde - 26 avenue Léon Blum - 63000 Clermont-Ferrand
Room 212

Research Seminar. The Causal Impact of the Electoral System on Corruption.

Pierre-Guillaume Méon
Université Libre de Bruxelles

Coauthors: Abel François and Nicolas Lagios

Abstract

We estimate the causal effect of the type of electoral system on corruption by exploiting a feature of French municipal elections: Municipalities with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants use an individual majority system, while those above this threshold use a proportional closed-list system. Crossing the threshold therefore implies two opposite changes: reduced individual accountability, which may increase corruption, and stronger collective control, which may reduce it. Using a regression discontinuity design with both survey and actual corruption data, we find that the individual accountability effect dominates, as exceeding the threshold leads to higher levels of both perceived and actual corruption.