PhD defence: Kalo Achille Sanou

Kalo Achille Sanou
Université Clermont Auvergne, CERDI

Examiners

Bertrand Laporte, Professor, Université Clermont Auvergne
Ahmed Tritah, Professor, Université de Poitiers
Youssoufou Hamadou Daouda, Professor, Université Djibo Hamani de Tahoua
Vianney Dequiedt, Professor, Université Clermont Auvergne
Bernadette Dia Kamgnia, Associate Professor, Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et Sociales/CIRES
Michaël Goujon, Professor, Université Clermont Auvergne

Abstract

The taxation of mineral resources constitutes a major strategic lever for domestic revenue mobilization and economic development in Africa, particularly in the gold sector. Gold extraction generates substantial revenues in the form of economic rents. However, the ability of African States to capture a significant share of these rents often remains limited due to political, institutional, and infrastructural constraints. The importance of resource taxation in strengthening public finances in Africa was emphasized at the Addis Ababa Conference in 2015 and reaffirmed at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Seville in July 2025, where the “Seville Compromise” stressed the need for more effective taxation of natural resources in order to enhance the fiscal capacity of African States and support their development ambitions. These challenges are also embedded in the broader frameworks of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which aim to promote inclusive growth, reduce inequalities, and improve governance. In this context, understanding how government ideology, infrastructure development, and electoral cycles influence mining taxation is essential for designing policies capable of maximizing the share of resource rents captured by the State, strengthening governance in the extractive sector, and supporting sustainable and equitable development. This thesis contributes to this objective by empirically analyzing the determinants of mining taxation across several African countries and by identifying the mechanisms through which states can enhance their fiscal capacity and improve their contribution to both national and regional economic development. The first chapter examines how the political orientation of heads of government (left vs. right) influences the adoption of legal and fiscal reforms in the extractive sector across a sample of 54 African countries over the period 2000-2020. The results show that, although ideology does not significantly affect the likelihood of reform implementation, the reforms themselves have a tangible impact on the de facto average effective tax rate (AETR), which measures the share of extractive rents captured by the State. In particular, left-leaning governments tend to increase the share of rents captured by the State, whereas right-leaning governments are associated with a reduction in that share. The second chapter investigates the effect of infrastructure development on the de jure average effective tax rate (AETR) in 22 African gold-producing countries over the period 2005-2020. The analysis shows that more developed infrastructure - particularly roads and railways - is associated with more effective mining taxation. Institutions play a mediating role: regime durability, overall institutional quality, and control of corruption amplify this effect by creating conditions conducive to improved resource rent capture. The third chapter examines the impact of presidential elections on the de jure average effective tax rate (AETR) in 20 African countries over the period 2000-2020, while incorporating regional spillover effects. The results indicate that presidential elections temporarily reduce the AETR, suggesting the presence of fiscal manipulation or clientelist practices. However, these negative effects are mitigated in countries with higher levels of democracy, transparency (particularly membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative - EITI), and institutional quality. In such contexts, elections may even strengthen mining taxation.

Keywords

Average Effective Tax Rate, Mining Rent-Sharing, Africa, Political ldeology, Infrastructures, Elections.

https://theses.fr/s363567