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Roberta Ziparo (AMSE)

Publié le 17 mai 2023 Mis à jour le 31 mai 2023
Le 23 mai 2023 De 12:15 à 13:30
Pôle Tertiaire - Site La Rotonde - 26 avenue Léon Blum - 63000 Clermont-Ferrand
Salle 212

Séminaire recherche

Roberta Ziparo

Investment and Reputation within the household


This paper studies the dynamic relationship between intra-household specialization, resource allocation and women's investment decisions. We consider household investments delegated to the wife in settings where wives that are perceived to be savvy investors by their husbands are entrusted with a larger share of the budget. We show, first theoretically, then empirically in a series of experiments with couples in Malawi, that a signaling game can result, in which wives, in order to maintain control over a larger share of the budget, (a) under-invest in novel goods with unknown returns; and (b) knowingly over-use low-return goods in order to hide bad purchase decisions, we call this the intra-household sunk cost effect.