Oscar Barrera (Sorbonne Université)

Information and Normative Economics on Attitudes Towards the Top one Percent

Résumé

We study the effects of providing quantitative information and normative economics about top earners on people's attitudes towards the richest 1 percent. We conduct an online experiment with 2000 French participants assigned randomly to either only quantitative information on top earners' income levels and their respective sources of income (capital vs. labor), or to quantitative information plus normative egalitarian interpretations. We find that: (i) respondents overestimate the income of the richest 1 percent and want them to pay a higher income tax rate than the current one. (ii) Quantitative information shifts attitudes about top earners towards the unfavorable spectrum. This effect comes mainly from information on the sources of income. (iii) Quantitative information by itself does not affect preferences towards the top income tax rate. In contrast, (iv) quantitative and normative egalitarian interpretations lead respondents to choose a higher income tax rate for the richest 1 percent.