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Lieu : Pôle Tertiaire - Site La Rotonde - 26 avenue Léon Blum - 63000 Clermont-Ferrand

Lieu(x)

Pôle Tertiaire - Site La Rotonde - 26 avenue Léon Blum - 63000 Clermont-Ferrand

Salle 210

Séminaire

Reputation and the "Need for Enemies"

RÉSUMÉ

Reputation to be competent in solving some problem is useful only if the problem remains in the future. Hence, the incentive to keep the “enemy” alive: an agent may do wrong in his job precisely because he is competent. The paper develops this mechanism in a general career concerns framework, and shows that a tradeoff between reputation and the need for enemies emerges. As a result, agents are induced to produce only moderate effort and only moderately-skilled agents are likely to be appointed. Implications of the analysis are discussed in a multitasking environment with incomplete transparency. Some evidences in principal-agent relationships and political arena are presented to illustrate our theory.

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